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Abstract:  
I consider the efficiency of liability rules when courts obtain imperfect information 
about precautionary behavior. I ask what tort rules are consistent with socially 
efficient precautions, what informational requirements the evidence about the parties’ 
behavior must satisfy, what decision rules courts should apply when faced with 
imperfectly informative evidence, whether these decision rules can be formulated in 
terms of the legal concept of standard of proof, and whether some general 
characterization of the efficient standard can be given. I show that court judgments 
provide appropriate incentives to exert care if they signal that the party prevailing at 
trial most likely exerted due care, neither more nor less. 
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11 Introduction
This paper considers the role of the legal concept of standard of proof in
extending the economic model of tort law to situations where courts make
errors in assessing care. The basic model without court error is well known to
yield clear-cut predictions on how legal liability for accidents a¤ects precau-
tionary behavior. When only unilateral care is involved, potential injurers
are induced to take e¢ cient precautions under the strict liability rule or the
negligence rule if courts set due care at the socially optimal level. With
bilateral or joint-care, when potential victims as well as injurers a¤ect the
risk of harm, the rst-best allocation of care is implemented under a variety
of negligence-based rules, including simple negligence, negligence with the
defense of contributory negligence, strict liability with the same defense, and
comparative negligence.1
By contrast, no simple conclusion seems to emerge when the partiesbe-
havior is imperfectly observable. The standard result is that the risk of court
error may lead to either under or overcompliance with due care. If the courts
information is imperfect but not too noisy, a negligence rule would induce
excessive precautions. In joint-care situations, equilibrium outcomes are said
to be second-best under any liability rule. How the di¤erent rules compare
would depend on the likelihood of victim versus injurer negligence, although
it is also argued that court error is likely to matter less with comparative
negligence. It has also been observed that courts could restore e¢ cient in-
centives by letting the legal standard of care di¤er from the socially e¢ cient
level, but no general principle is o¤ered as to how they can proceed to do
so.2
Ad hoc o¤setting adjustments in the legal standard of precautions are
awkward considering that the interpretation of due care as socially e¢ cient
care was a seminal assumption of the economic approach to tort law. Once
this is discarded, it is not clear what the model has to say about actual tort
rules. The trade-o¤ seems to be that, if the interpretation is maintained,
negligence-based liability must lead to undesirable outcomes whenever courts
may err in assessing care. This paper makes the point that such inconclu-
sive results are unwarranted and stem from two shortcomings of the earlier
1The basic model is due to Brown (1973) and is developed in Landes and Posner (1987)
and Shavell (1987). See also Kaplow and Shavell (2002) for a compact survey.
2See Diamond (1974), Calfee and Craswell (1984, 1986), Cooter and Ulen (1986, 2000),
Shavell (1987), Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990) and Edlin (1994).
2literature on legal error.
The rst is that court decisions were usually modeled as if courts were
unaware that they possess imperfect information or attached no importance
to the risk of error. This is surprising considering the importance in law,
notably in common law, of concepts such as the standard of proof (the re-
quired weight of evidence) for court decisions. Another shortcoming is that
the informational prerequisites for the provision of e¢ cient incentives under
a negligence-based rule were not clearly specied. Obviously, if the evidence
about a partys behavior is very noisy, the nding of negligence must be unin-
formed and therefore cannot induce e¢ cient care. One would therefore want
to characterize the informational conditions under which negligence-based
rules are at all consistent with implementation of rst-best precautions. A
related issue is the extent to which the informational requirements interact
with the standard of proof.
Similar questions have been tackled in a more recent strand of literature
but from a di¤erent perspective focusing on the relation between legal error,
litigation expenditures, incentives to sue, ex ante incentives to exert care,
the social cost of legal error, etc.3 In this paper, I abstract from most of
these considerations and revert to the issues raised in the earlier literature.
I consider the basic model of liability rules and ask whether and under what
conditions the e¢ cient precaution levels are implemented when courts obtain
imperfect information about the partiesbehavior. Specically, I ask what
tort rules are consistent with implementation of the rst best, what infor-
mational requirements the evidence about the partiesbehavior must satisfy,
what decision rules courts should apply when faced with imperfectly infor-
mative evidence, whether these decision rules can be formulated in terms of
the legal concept of standard of proof, and whether some general character-
ization of the e¢ cient standard can be given. In this analysis, I assume that
courts are unsure only about the partiesactual precautions, i.e., courts are
able to determine the e¢ cient levels which they take as due care.4
I show that, if the risk of error is inevitable, e¢ cient care in the bilateral
case can only be obtained with rules that take into consideration the pre-
cautionary behavior of both parties (e.g., strict liability with contributory
3See for instance Rubinfeld and Sappington (1987), Polinsky and Shavell (1989), Hylton
(1990), Kaplow and Shavell (1994), Hay and Spier (1997), Sanchirico (1997), Bernardo,
Talley and Welch (2000).
4The model is closely related to Fluet (1999) although that paper dealt with the neg-
ligence rule in unilateral care problems under limited liability constraints.
3negligence is ine¢ cient). Regarding informational requirements, a necessary
but not quite su¢ cient condition is that there be potential realizations of the
evidence such that, following the occurrence of harm, e¢ cient care by both
parties would appear most likely. Finally, with zero-one liability rules (i.e.,
rules where either the victim or the injurer bears 100 percent of the loss),
the underlying standard of proof must be such that court rulings, viewed
as signals, convey that the prevailing party barely exerted due care, neither
more nor less. In other words, a decision in favor of a party must signal
to outsiders that bare compliance with due care was the partys most likely
action. I show that this implies a form of preponderance of evidence the
standard of proof in common law for civil disputes in the sense that a claim
is established only if it appears more likely than not to the court.
Section 2 presents the framework. The main results are derived in section
3 for unilateral and bilateral care. Section 4 analyses the e¤ect of changes in
the informational quality of the evidence, extends the analysis to compara-
tive negligence, and discusses the extent to which punitive damages reduce
informational requirements. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The starting point is the simple accident model with risk neutral agents and
zero litigation costs. An activity imposes a risk of loss L on third parties and
the only concern is the extent of precautions to reduce this risk exercising
the activity is taken as given. The probability of accident is p(u; v), a twice
di¤erentiable and strictly convex function with negative partial derivatives
pu and pv, where u, v  0 are the expenditures on precautions by injurer and
victim respectively. The socially e¢ cient levels minimize p(u; v)L+u+v, the
sum of precaution and accident costs. Assuming an interior solution, they
satisfy
  pu(u; v)L =   pv(u; v)L = 1: (1)
As noted, di¤erent liability rules implement e¢ cient care if courts can
perfectly determine the partiesbehavior and if legal standards of precaution
are set at the socially e¢ cient levels. To illustrate, under simple negligence
the injurer pays full compensatory damages to the victim if he is found
negligent, irrespective of the victims behavior. The expected cost facing a
potential injurer is then U = p(u; v)(u)L+u where (u) = 1 if u < u and is
zero otherwise; a potential victims expected cost is V = p(u; v)[1 (u)]L+v.
4E¢ cient care is the Nash equilibrium, that is,
U(u; v)  U(u; v) and V (u; v)  V (u; v): (2)
A single change is introduced. Rather than observing u and v, courts
must rely on imperfectly informative evidence about the levels of care. The
content of the evidence testimonies by witnesses, expert opinions, various
documents is stochastic with probabilities that depend on the partiescare
levels. Evidentiary outcomes are assumed to be comparable in terms of the
more favorable thanrelation dened in Milgrom (1981), i.e., they can be
ranked in terms of how damaging they are for the purpose of assessing a
partys behavior. All relevant information can then be summarized by a ran-
dom variable satisfying the monotone likelihood property an indexcon-
veying how relatively unfavorable the underlying multidimensional evidence
turns out to be.5
The signals about u and v are denoted ex and ey respectively, with cumu-
lative distributions F (x; u) and G(y; v) and corresponding density functions
f(x; u) and g(y; v) assumed twice continuously di¤erentiable. Larger values
correspond to more favorable evidence. The signals are independent for any
levels of care and they take their values in the unit interval, which is with-
out loss of generality since the range is arbitrary. This framework, with one
additional condition, is summarized in the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: For all u and v, f(x; u) > 0 and g(y; v) > 0 for x, y 2 [0; 1]
and are zero otherwise.
Assumption 2: For all u and v, fu(x; u)=f(x; u) and gv(y; v)=g(y; v) are
strictly increasing in x and y respectively.
The rst assumption means that error is inevitable because all possible
realizations of the evidence are consistent with di¤erent levels of care. The
second is the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) and implies Fu,
Gv < 0, except at the boundary of the support where the derivatives are nil.
The third and last assumption is a convexity condition. Consider the
event accident occurs and ex < x for some x 2 (0; 1). Its probability
is p(u; v)F (u; x) and is strictly decreasing in u. Hence, the event represents
5Courts need not have direct access to the evidence. In an adversarial procedure, as
evidence favors either the plainti¤ or the defendant, it will be submitted if submission
costs are negligible and both parties have access to the same veriable evidence (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1986).
5unfavorable information about the injurers level of care, i.e., it is bad news.
I assume that, as the injurer exerts less care, the probability of bad news
about his behavior increases at an increasing rate relative to the probability
of accident itself. The same holds with respect to evidence concerning the
victim. To write this formally, let u(p; v) and v(p; u) be obtained by inverting
the probability of accident function p(u; v); that is, they represent a partys
level of care as a function of the probability of accident, given the other
partys care.
Assumption 3: For x; y 2 (0; 1), pF [x; u(p; v)] and pG[y; v(p; u)] are strictly
convex in p.
The assumption implies that pF and pG are strictly convex in u and v
respectively, ensuring that the partiesoptimization problems are well be-
haved.6
Courts are able to perfectly assess damages and the extent of the risk as a
function of care. As in the basic accident model, they can therefore determine
the e¢ cient levels of precaution, which they take as due care. However, courts
do not observe the true levels of care. They obtain evidence which they
know to be imperfect and from which they draw likelihood assessments. On
this basis, and given the tort rule that applies, they assign liability. When
the rule requires a decision concerning a partys negligence, courts weigh
whether the evidence about a partys behavior is su¢ ciently unfavorable.
This amounts to using critical values x and y such that the injurer is found
negligent if ex < x and the victim is found negligent if ey < y. The evidentiary
thresholds x and y reect the courtsstandard of proof. Lower thresholds
mean that for nding negligence courts need more convincing evidence that
care was insu¢ cient. The parties know the courts decision rule and therefore
anticipate the probability of being found negligent as a function of their level
of care.
6Assumption 1 is known as invariant support. Assumption 3 is in lieu of the Convexity
of the Distribution Function Condition. Given puu > 0, Fu < 0, @u(p; v)=@p < 0, it implies
@2p(u; v)F (u; x)=@u2 = [@pF (x; u(p; v))=@p] puu +

@2pF (x; u(p; v))=@p2

(pu)
2 > 0:
63 Main results
It is useful to discuss rst the case where the occurrence of harm depends
only on the potential injurers behavior. The relation between evidentiary
thresholds and incentives to exert care is then straightforward. The proper-
ties extend to joint care.
Unilateral care
When only the injurers precautions matter, the probability of accident is
p(u) with p0 < 0 and p00 > 0. Socially e¢ cient care minimizes p(u)L + u,
satisfying
 p0(u)L = 1: (3)
Strict liability induces e¢ cient precautions. The issue is whether this is also
feasible with the negligence rule.
If x is the threshold for nding negligence, a potential injurer minimizes
the expected cost p(u)F (x; u)L + u. The equilibrium level of care satises
the rst-order condition7
  [p0(u)F (x; u) + p(u)Fu(x; u)]L = 1: (4)
Comparing with (3), u is a solution if x = 1 since in that case F = 1
and Fu = 0, but this corresponds to the strict liability rule. The negligence
rule requires that an injurer exerting due care avoids liability with positive
probability, i.e., u must be a solution for some x < 1.
Substituting from (3) in (4) and setting care at the socially optimal level,
the e¢ cient threshold solves
'(x) :=   [p0(u)F (x; u) + p(u)Fu(x; u)] =  p0(u): (5)
'(x) is the change in the probability of being found negligent when care
varies marginally from the e¢ cient level, given the evidentiary threshold.
Condition (5) therefore requires that, when the injurer exerts due care, a
marginal change in the level of care has the same e¤ect on the probability of
being found negligent as it has on the probability of accident.
Figure 1 about here 
7The second-order condition is satised by assumption 3.
7Obviously, '(0) = 0 and '(1) =  p0(u). In gure 1, ' is drawn as a
function of F (x; u), a positive monotonic transformation of x. Taking the
rst and second-order derivatives,
d'(x)
dF (x; u)
=  

p0(u) + p(u)
fu(x; u
)
f(x; u)

; (6)
d2'(x)
dF (x; u)2
=   p(u
)
f(x; u)
d
dx

fu(x; u
)
f(x; u)

< 0; (7)
where the inequality follows fromMLRP. Hence, the curve is strictly concave.
The e¢ cient evidentiary threshold is denoted bx. F (bx; u) is the probability
that an injurer exerting due care is erroneously found negligent and will be
referred to as the type 1 error.
There are two requirements for the socially e¢ cient precautions to be
implemented with a negligence rule. First, the relevant curves must intersect,
i.e., there must exist bx < 1 as dened. This depends on how informative the
evidence is likely to be with respect to the injurers behavior. As discussed
in section 4, insu¢ ciently informative evidence entails a curve such as a in
the gure. That curve remains below the horizontal line drawn from   p0(u)
except at the upper bound of the support. The consequence is that providing
the desired incentives can then only be obtained with the strict liability rule.
Assuming the evidence is su¢ ciently informative, the second requirement
is that courts use the appropriate evidentiary threshold. This has to do
with the standard of proof for establishing negligence. Before discussing
the standard, I give a condition ensuring that the evidence is su¢ ciently
informative.
Condition 1: u maximizes p(u)f(x0; u) for some x0 < 1.
The expression p(u)f(x; u) is the probability that harm occurs together
with the realized evidence being x, conditional on the level of care. In sta-
tistical terminology, it is the likelihood of the unknown care level u, given
the datawhich comprise the occurrence of harm and the evidence x. Con-
dition 1 requires that, for some realization of the evidence, due care is the
most likely level of care. When the court is presented with x0, its maximum
likelihood estimateof the injurers care is precisely u.
Note the di¤erence with a Bayesian formulation. If priors about u are
described by the density (u) and posteriors by (u j x), then by Bayesrule
8the relative posterior probability of u versus u0 is
(u j x)
(u0 j x) =

p(u)f(x; u)
p(u0)f(x; u0)

(u)
(u0)
;
where the term in brackets is the likelihood ratio of u versus u0 given the
data. In what follows, court decision-making disregards priors about the
injurers conduct and is solely in terms of relative likelihood. This captures
the idea that the courts decision rests only on the particular factswhose
probability depends on what the defendant might have done. The issue of
priors is discussed further in section 5.
From the necessary condition for a maximum in condition 1, x0 solves
  p
0(u)
p(u)
=
fu(x; u
)
f(x; u)
: (8)
The right-hand side is strictly increasing in x, hence x0 is unique.8 The
critical x0 has another interpretation as well. Recalling (6) and (7), '(x)
reaches a strict interior maximum at x0 as represented in gure 1. The next
result follows immediately.
Lemma 1: Under condition 1, there is a unique bx < x0 such that '(bx) =
 p0(u). '(x) is increasing if x < x0, decreasing if x > x0.
A threshold x0 < bx leads to underprecaution, a threshold x00 2 (bx; 1)
to overprecaution. A threshold lower than the e¢ cient bx corresponds to a
higher standard of proof than would be required to provide e¢ cient incen-
tives. Conversely, a less demanding standard of proof provides too much
incentives.9
Lemma 2: If x 7 x0, then argmaxu p(u)f(x; u) 7 u.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 2 partitions possible realizations of the evidence in terms of
whether inadequate (u < u) or su¢ cient care (u  u) is most likely. Its
interpretive role is discussed after the next proposition.
8As a function of x, fu=f increases from negative to positive. It needs to become
su¢ ciently large for there to exist x0 as dened. Loosely speaking, poor information
corresponds to a at fu=f function.
9In the limit, as x00 tends to unity, the negligence rule becomes indistinguishable from
strict liability. A threshold greater than x0 can be interpreted as putting on the injurer
the burden of persuasion(see footnote 18).
9Proposition 1: If bx is the e¢ cient evidentiary threshold for negligence in
the unilateral case, then argmaxu p(u)f(x; u) < u for all x < bx. Moreover,bx is e¢ cient if and only if u maximizes p(u) (1  F (bx; u)).
Proof: See Appendix.
The court nds negligence only if x < bx, when the most likely level of
care is below due care. The underlying standard of proof therefore entails
a form of preponderance of evidence, i.e., negligence is deemed proved
only if inadequate care is more likely than due care given the evidence at
trial. However, the condition is not su¢ cient. By lemma 2, for any x 2
[bx; x0), inadequate care is also more likely than due care but the defendant
is nevertheless not found negligent. The interpretation is therefore that, to
establish negligence, inadequate care must be su¢ ciently more likely than
due care, i.e., there must be a su¢ cient preponderance of evidence. How
much so is characterized in the second part of proposition 1.
The characterization is in terms of court rulings viewed as signals about
defendantsbehavior. I now consider the case of outsiders who understand
the situation and the courtsdecision rule, but do not have access to the
detailed evidence presented at trial. What should they infer about a defen-
dants likely level of care when the court decides in his favor? For instance,
in a criminal trial guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, hence
acquittal need not be a strong signal that the accused is innocent. A much
lower standard of proof preponderance of evidence is used for civil trials
in common law. A decision in favor of the defendant is then a stronger signal
that he exerted due care.
One way to approach these questions is to ask what estimate outsiders
would form of the injurers care, upon knowing only that harm occurred and
that the injurer was found non negligent. As a function of the care level,
the probability of this event is p(u)(1  F (bx; u)). Borrowing from statistical
terminology once more, the expression is the likelihood of the unknown u
given that harm occurred and that the defendant escaped liability. Thus,
the second part of the proposition states that, from the outsiderspoint of
view, the most likely level of care, when the injurer prevails, is due care,
i.e., u is the outsidersmaximum likelihood estimate of the injurers care.
Noting that
argmax
u
p(u)[1  F (x; u)]
is increasing in x, the interpretation is therefore that the courtsunderlying
10
standard of proof should not be weak to the point that a defendant escaping
liability suggests more than due care as would be the case with a threshold
to the right of bx. Neither should the standard be stringent to the point
that escaping liability suggests less than due care, as would follow from a
threshold to the left of bx.
Observe also that p(u)(1   F (bx; u)) is the probability that victims will
bear a loss, as a function of the injurers care level. Therefore, the evidentiary
threshold is e¢ cient if any deviation from due care by the injurer benets
potential victims. This generalizes a property of the negligence rule when
care is observable without error.10
To conclude the section, I relate the results to the existing literature.
The most common approach has been to assume that courts observe a signalex = u+ e", where e" is an error term, and that they nd negligence if ex < u.
Several authors (e.g., Shavell, 1987, Kolstad et al., 1990) have noted that
this induces insu¢ cient care if the variance of e" is large and excessive care if
it is small. By itself, ex = u + e" is consistent with and is in fact a particular
case of the present model provided ex satises MLRP.11 However, two points
were made. First, if the evidence is su¢ ciently poor (e.g., if the variance of e"
is large), there may be no threshold for negligence that induces e¢ cient care.
Secondly, as an evidentiary threshold, u is perfectly arbitrary.
To see this, observe that the rule nd negligence if ex < u takes no
account of how informative ex is. Furthermore, it disregards part of the
relevant evidence, namely the information from the occurrence of harm itself.
To take an extreme case, suppose care can be either low or high with, say,
ul = 0 and uh = 1. Suppose further that pl = 0:99 while ph = 0:01. The
mere occurrence of harm then constitutes rather strong evidence that care
was low. For a decision in favor of the injurer to convey that high care is at
least as likely as low care, the threshold for ex needs to be higher than u.
Proposition 1 nevertheless suggests that the common law standard of
proof may be too weak. According to the usual interpretation, a claim is
10Using the notation of section 2, the probability of loss by victims is then p(u)[1 (u)].
This is zero if u < u and it equals p(u) if u  u. Hence, it is maximized at u = u.
11Let H(") be the cumulative distribution function of e" with density h("). Then
F (x; u) = H(x   u) and MLRP is satised if (h0)2   hh00 > 0. With this specica-
tion, one would want to discard the convention that ex takes its values in the unit interval.
Alternatively, the signal ez := H(ex  u1) could be introduced where u1 > 0 is an arbitrary
xed level of care. ez 2 [0; 1] then conveys the same information as ex and it satises MLRP
if ex does.
11
established by a preponderance of evidenceif it is shown to be more likely
true than not true.12 Negligence would therefore be found whenever inade-
quate care is more likely than due care. By lemma 2, this amounts to using x0
as evidentiary threshold, resulting in overcompliance. The issue of excessive
care has been much debated in malpractice liability. A common argument is
that incentives to practice medicine defensively are increased by the possibil-
ity of court error, given that precautionary behavior is particularly di¢ cult
to verify ex post.13 The above suggests that excessive care results not so
much from the risk of court error per se as from too weak a standard of
proof.
Bilateral care
When both injurer and victim can take precautions, the e¢ cient levels min-
imize p(u; v)L+ u+ v and satisfy the rst-order conditions (1).
Liability rules for joint care belong to two categories. One class of rules
assigns liability on the basis of the behavior of only one party. This includes
simple negligence, where only the injurers behavior is taken into account,
and strict liability with the defense of contributory negligencewhere only
the victims behavior is considered. In the other class of rules, the behavior
of both parties is taken into account, as in negligence with the defense of
contributory negligenceand comparative negligence.
Rules in the rst category are ine¢ cient if behavior is imperfectly ob-
servable. Consider the simple negligence rule. With the threshold x, u and
v constitute a Nash equilibrium if u minimizes p(u; v)F (x; u)L + u and
v minimizes p(u; v)[1   F (x; u)]L + v. The e¢ cient v solves the second
problem only if F (x; u) = 0. By assumption 1, this implies F (x; u) = 0 for
all u. Hence, the injurer has no incentive to take care and u cannot be part
of the equilibrium. A similar argument applies to strict liability with the
defense of contributory negligence.14
Proposition 2: With bilateral care, the rules of negligence and of strict
liability with the defense of contributory negligence are inconsistent with the
rst-best allocation of care.
12A bare preponderance is su¢ cient, though the scales drop but a feathers weight
(Livanovitch vs Livanovitch, 99Vt. 327 131A. 799, 1926).
13The debate is surveyed in Kessler and McClellan (1995) who present evidence of excess
precautions.
14This is true if punitive damagesare ruled out. These are discussed in section 4.
12
The point is that, so long as courts may err in determining care, there are
no evidentiary thresholds under the above rules that implement the e¢ cient
precautions as a noncooperative equilibrium.
Among the second class of tort rules, the traditional one in common
law is negligence with the defense of contributory negligence, contributory
negligencehereafter.15 The injurer is then liable for the victims loss if he is
found negligent and the victim is not found negligent. With the thresholds x
and y for injurer and victim, the injurer is therefore liable only if the evidence
satises ex < x and ey  y. The injurers expected cost is then
U = p(u; v)F (x; u) (1 G(y; v))L+ u;
while that of the victim is
V = p(u; v) [1  F (x; u) (1 G(y; v))]L+ v.
At a Nash equilibrium with positive care levels, u and v satisfy the rst-
order conditions16:
  [pu(u; v)F (x; u) + p(u; v)Fu(x; u)] (1 G(y; v))L = 1;
 fpv(u; v) [1 F (x; u)(1 G(y; v))] + p(u; v)F (x; u)Gv(y; v)gL = 1:
Setting care at the e¢ cient levels and substituting from (1), the e¢ cient
thresholds bx and by solve:
  [pu(u; v)F (x; u)+p(u; v)Fu(x; u)] (1 G(y; v)) = pu(u; v); (9)
  [pv(u; v)G(y; v) + p(u; v)Gv(y; v)] =  pv(u; v): (10)
The last condition has the same form as (5) in the preceding section.
Thus, y = 1 is a solution but clearly only y < 1 is consistent with (9). In
the gures 2 and 3, all functions are evaluated at the e¢ cient care levels.
The e¢ cient thresholds are shown in terms of the type 1 errors  = F (bx; u)
15Interchanging the role of the parties, what follows also applies to the theoretical rule
of dual contributory negligence dened in Brown (1973). Under this rule the injurer
is always liable except when the victim is found negligent and the injurer nonnegligent.
Comparative negligence is considered in section 4.
16The conditions for an equilibrium are the same as in (2), but with the partiesexpected
cost U and V dened as above. By assumption 3 these functions are strictly convex in u
and v respectively.
13
and  = G(by; v). I introduce a condition which parallels condition 1 for
unilateral care.
Condition 2: For some x0, y0 < 1,
(u; v) = argmax
u;v
p(u; v)g(y0; v)f(x0; u):
Again, the expression is the likelihood of the pair of care levels (u; v) given
the occurrence of harm and the evidence x0 and y0. The condition requires
that there be realizations of the evidence for which due care by both parties
is most likely.
Figures 2 and 3 about here 
Extending previous results, condition 2 implies the existence of by < y0
solving (10). However, the condition is not su¢ cient with respect to the in-
jurer as there is an asymmetry in the determination of the e¢ cient thresholds.
The one concerning the victim is obtained directly from (10) independently
of the injurers threshold, but the latter depends on the type 1 error with
respect to the victim.
Lemma 3: Under condition 2, there exists by < y0 solving (10); there existsbx  x0 solving (9) if
  [pu(u; v)F (x0; u) + p(u; v)Fu(x0; u)]   pu(u
; v)
1 G(by; v) :
If the above inequality is strict, there are in fact two solutions to (9), as
shown in gure 3. I retain only the one corresponding to the smallest type 1
error.17 As discussed below, this is appropriate if the victim bears the burden
of persuasion regarding the injurers negligence and if the standard of proof
involves a form of preponderance of evidence. The following is the analog
to proposition 1.
Proposition 3: bx and by are e¢ cient evidentiary thresholds under contrib-
utory negligence if and only if
u = argmax
u
p(u; v) [1  F (bx; u) (1 G(by; v))] ; (11)
v = argmax
v
p(u; v) (1 G(by; v))F (bx; u): (12)
17In the gures, 0 = F (x0; u) and 0 = G(y0; v
). The solutions  and 0 to (9)
satisfy  < 0 < 0.
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argmaxv p(u
; v)g(y; v) < v if y < by, argmaxu p(u; v)f(x; u) < uif x < bx
with bx  x0.
Proof: See Appendix.
As in the unilateral case, negligence is found only if inadequate care is
more likely than due care. This is consistent with the injurer bearing the
burden of proving the victims negligence, by a su¢ cient preponderance of
evidence, in order to benet from the defense of contributory negligence. It
is also consistent with the victim bearing the burden of proving the injurers
negligence, provided we choose the solution bx  x0 to condition (9) rather
than the one corresponding to 0 in gure 3. With the latter, it would be as
if the injurer had the burden of proving that he was not negligent.18
Consider now the interpretation of court decisions as signals about the
partiesbehavior. The expression in (11) is the likelihood of the injurers
care level u upon knowing that harm occurred and that the injurer won the
trial. A suit won by the injurer must convey that he barely undertook due
care, neither more nor less. The maximum likelihood u takes into account
the fact that the injurer avoids liability if found non-negligent or if the victim
is found negligent. The expression in (12) is the likelihood of the victims
care level v given that the victim won the case. The maximum likelihood v
is then the same as would be obtained by asking what level of care is most
likely, given that the victim was not found negligent.
The result implies that courts should apply a weaker standard of proof for
nding injurer negligence than for victim negligence. Indeed, at the e¢ cient
threshold19,
argmax
u
p(u; v) [1  F (bx; u)] > u:
The outsidersmaximum likelihood u, upon learning that the injurer was
found non-negligent (and not simply that he won the case), is greater than
due care. Intuitively, a ruling of non negligence with respect to the injurer
represents more favorable information about the injurers behavior than a
18Let 0 = F (x0; u) so that x0 > x0. With the threshold x0, the injurer avoids being
found negligent only if x  x0. By lemma 2, this implies argmaxu p(u; v)f(x; u)  u,
i.e., a nding of negligence is avoided only if su¢ cient care appears most likely. To keep
the exposition simple, I henceforth disregard this possible allocation of the burden of
persuasion.
19By proposition 3, u maximizes p(1 F ) +GpF . Since pF is decreasing in u, it must
be that p(1  F ) is increasing at u.
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similar ruling about the victim. Accordingly, it must be that courts require
less convincing evidence to nd an injurer negligent.
Finally, observe that the expression in (11) is the probability that the
victim bears a loss, as a function of the injurers precautions and assuming the
victim undertook due care. A potential victim benets from any deviation by
the injurer from his e¢ cient care level. Similarly, the right-hand side of (12)
is the probability that the injurer will have to pay damages. Any deviation by
the victim from his e¢ cient care level benets potential injurers. Thus, under
the e¢ cient thresholds, the liability rule exhibits a saddle pointproperty.
Schweizer (2005) has shown that this property is shared by e¢ cient liability
rules in many di¤erent contexts.
4 Extensions
Information
Inducing e¢ cient precautions is feasible only with su¢ ciently informative
evidence. I now discuss the e¤ect of changes in the quality of the evidence.
Intuitively, more informative evidence should reduce the risk of error.
Consider two situations di¤ering only in the quality of the evidence about
the injurers behavior. One is characterized by F (x; u), the other by the
distribution H(x; u) also satisfying assumptions 1 to 3. A general criterion
for ranking information structures is the following.
Definition: H is more informative than F with respect to u if, for all u,
Hu(x1; u) < Fu(x2; u) for x1; x2 2 (0; 1) such that F (x1; u) = H(x2; u).
The more informative the evidence, the more the probability of unfavor-
able evidence is sensitive to changes in the level of care. The condition is
equivalent to other well known criteria.20
To see the implications, consider again the negligence rule in the case of
unilateral care. Choose the evidentiary thresholds so that the type 1 error is
the same in both situations, i.e., F (x1; u) = H(x2; u). Then, if H is more
informative than F ,
  [p0(u)H(x2; u)+p(u)Hu(x2; u)] >
  [p0(u)F (x1; u)+p(u)Fu(x1; u)] :
20Demougin and Fluet (2001) show the equivalence with Kims (1995) criterion dened
in terms of mean preserving spreads of the likelihood ratio fu=f .
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Marginal incentives are greater with H and this is true for any pair of
thresholds with the same type 1 error. In gure 1, the '-curve for H is
therefore above the one for F , for example curve b. Conversely, if H were
less informative, the curve would be below the one for F . A particular case
is curve a where implementing the e¢ cient level of care is no longer feasible
under a negligence rule.21 Otherwise, the less informative the evidence, the
greater the type 1 error under the e¢ cient standard of proof. This benets
potential victims since injurers are held liable more often.
Similar results obtain under joint care with the rule of contributory neg-
ligence. In the gures 2 and 3, less informative evidence shifts the incentive
curves downward. With su¢ ciently poorer evidence about either the victim
or the injurer, at least one set of curves will not intersect and the rst best
will no longer be feasible.
The e¤ect on court error is similarly straightforward. Less informative
evidence about the victims behavior leads to a higher type 1 error . In
turn, this induces a downward shift in the relevant curve of gure 3, yielding
an increase in the type 1 error  as well. The redistributive e¤ects on the
partieswell-being is not a priori obvious, but I show below that the change
is benecial to potential victims (i.e.,  increases more than ). Finally, less
informative evidence about the injurers behavior only a¤ects the curve in
gure 3 and is obviously benecial to victims.
Proposition 4: Under contributory negligence with the e¢ cient standards
of proof, potential victims benet from poorer evidence about either the
victimsor the injurersprecautions.
(i) Poorer evidence about the victims care increases the type 1 errors for
both victim and injurer;
(ii) poorer evidence about the injurers care increases the injurer type 1
error with no e¤ect on victim type 1 error.
Proof: See Appendix.
When courts obtain perfect information about the partiesbehavior, vic-
tims bear 100 per cent of expected accident costs under contributory negli-
gence. The possibility of error shifts part of these costs to injurers. It should
be emphasized that the informational quality of the evidence a¤ects the risk
of erroneously nding negligence, although the underlying standard of proof
21In particular, condition 1 is then not satised. Thus, the conditions 1 and 2 refer to
how informative the evidence is.
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is invariant and satises the conditions of proposition 3. Irrespective of the
quality of the evidence, a ruling in favor of a party signals that bare compli-
ance with due care is most likely. Given the standard of proof, the type 1
errors then follow from the quality of the evidence.
Comparative negligence
Between the mid 1960s and early 1980s, most US jurisdictions replaced the
principle of contributory negligence with comparative negligence. The latter
di¤ers by apportioning the loss between injurer and victim when both parties
are found negligent, which is seen as less harsh than the complete bar to
recovery by a negligent victim under contributory negligence.22 Comparative
or relative negligence is also the main liability rule in England and in civil
law countries.
I consider a simple form where the victim bears a given fraction  of the
loss when both parties are found negligent.23 With the evidentiary thresholds
x and y, the injurer is liable for the whole loss if ex < x and ey  y and for a
fraction 1   if ex < x and ey < y. The injurers expected cost is
U = p(u; v)F (x; u) [1 G(y; v) + (1  )G(y; v)]
= p(u; v)F (x; u) (1  G(y; v))L+ u
and the victims is
V = p(u; v) [1  F (x; u) (1  G(y; v))]L+ v:
Proceeding as before, the e¢ cient thresholds x0 and y0 solve
  [pu(u; v)F (x; u)+p(u; v)Fu(x; u)] (1 G(y; v)) = pu(u; v); (13)
  [pv(u; v)G(y; v)+p(u; v)Gv(y; v)]  = pv(u; v): (14)
Again there may be several solutions but I retain only the ones with the
smallest type 1 errors.24
22The fairnessargument played an important role in the spread of comparative negli-
gence. See Landes and Posner (1987), but also Curran (1992) who argues that the adoption
of strict product liability in the 1960s reduced manufacturersopposition to comparative
negligence.
23There are many variants of comparative negligence. Actual rules usually apportion
the loss in proportion to the partiesdegree of negligence.
24That is, x0 < x0 and y0 < y0.
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Comparing (14) and (10), it is readily seen that  < 1 amounts to a
proportional downward shift in the incentive curve of gure 2. Hence, we
must have y0 > by, where the latter is the e¢ cient threshold under contribu-
tory negligence. Since the injurer now sometimes shares part of the loss, the
standard of proof for victim negligence must be less demanding in order to
provide potential victims with the appropriate incentives. Comparing (13)
and (9), the implications regarding the injurers threshold are at rst sight
ambiguous:  < 1 increases the injurers incentives but a larger y reduces
them.
Proposition 5: Let bx and by be the e¢ cient thresholds under con-
tributory negligence, x0 and y0 the e¢ cient thresholds under comparative
negligence. Then x0 > bx, y0 > by and potential victims are better o¤ under
comparative negligence than under contributory negligence.
Proof: See Appendix.
The standard of proof for nding negligence must now be weaker for both
parties, although inadequate care is still required to be more likely than due
care. Victims are found negligent more often but nevertheless face a lower
expected cost than under contributory negligence.25 Thus, the switch to
comparative negligence may indeed benet victims while still maintaining
e¢ cient incentives.
Proposition 5 also shows that comparative negligence does not improve
things regarding the feasibility of implementing the rst best compared to
contributory negligence. If the rst best is feasible with some  < 1, it is
also feasible with  = 1 but the converse does not hold. When the evidence
about the partiesbehavior is poor, contributory negligence may therefore
be the better rule since comparative negligence dilutes incentives.26 On the
other hand, if common law courts apply too weak a standard of proof (cor-
responding, say, to the thresholds x0 and y0) and if the evidence is relatively
informative, comparative negligence may well yield less distortion from the
rst best.27
25Similar results were found by Edlin (1994), but with the interpretation that due care
standards should be set higher under comparative negligence.
26There is evidence that the switch to comparative negligence from contributory negli-
gence has resulted in reduced incentives to exert care (e.g., White, 1989, and Flanagan et
al., 1989).
27This is reminiscent of the claim by Cooter and Ulen (1986) and Edlin (1994) that
comparative negligence would generally fare better.
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Punitive damages
Punitive in addition to compensatory damages are sometimes awarded, usu-
ally because the defendants conduct has been particularly reprehensible.
The economics literature has stressed the deterrence rationale for situations
where an injurer may escape liability for the harm he caused, e.g., because he
cannot always be identied.28 I briey examine the extent to which punitive
damages reduce informational requirements in the joint care problem.
From the principal-agent literature, it is well known that su¢ ciently large
money incentives solve the moral hazard problem when the agent is risk neu-
tral, even though information is poor. In the bilateral care situation, one
therefore expects that appropriate punitive damages can always induce in-
jurers to undertake e¢ cient precautions. I examine whether, under contribu-
tory negligence, the fear of not being paid punitive damages (assuming these
do not go to the state) might also induce potential victims to exert care, even
though the evidence about their behavior is poor. I show that the answer
is negative, i.e., the prospect of more than compensatory damages has no
e¤ect on informational requirements with respect to the victim nor on the
standard of proof for deciding victim negligence.
LetD  L be the total damages awarded (the punitive part is thenD L)
under the contributory negligence rule with evidentiary threshold x and y.
The injurers expected cost is
U = p(u; v)F (x; u) (1 G(y; v))D + u (15)
and the victims is
V = p(u; v) [L  F (x; u) (1 G(y; v))D] + v. (16)
The victim bears the loss L but is paid D when he wins the case.
Obviously, x > 0 is needed to provide the injurer with incentives. From
(16), it follows that v is the best reply to u if the victims threshold satises
@p(u; v) (1 G(by; v))
@v

v=v
= 0:
This is the same condition as in proposition 3. Informational requirements
concerning the victim are therefore not improved and the standard of proof
28See for instance Polinsky and Shavell (1998).
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is the same as before. Given by, it is clear from (15) that u can be made to be
the best reply to v with di¤erent combinations of x and D. One possibility
is to disregard the injurers conduct altogether and to set x = 1 with the
damage multiplier equal to
D
L
=
1
1 G(by; v) ;
i.e., the reciprocal of the probability that the injurer avoids liability due to
the victim being found negligent. Overall, except for the punitive part, the
rule corresponds to strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence.
The implication is that information about the injurers conduct is not needed
with appropriate punitive damages, although the need to obtain su¢ ciently
informative evidence about the victims care remains unchanged. The next
proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 6: Appropriate punitive damages implement the e¢ cient
levels of care, provided the threshold by for victim negligence satises v =
argmaxv p(u
; v) (1 G(by; v)).
5 Concluding remarks
A simplifying assumption of the foregoing analysis is that veriable infor-
mation about precautionary behavior is exogenously made available to the
parties and can be communicated to the court at negligible cost. Within the
limits of this assumption, the basic economic model of liability rules easily
extends to imperfect information about care.
When the situation involves bilateral precautions, e¢ cient care is imple-
mented through negligence-based rules assigning liability on the basis of both
partiesbehavior, provided the evidence is su¢ ciently informative and courts
use the appropriate standard of proof. In all-or-nothing rules such as negli-
gence with the defense of contributory negligence, the underlying standard
of proof is e¢ cient if the outcome of a trial conveys that the prevailing party
most likely exerted neither more nor less than due care. In rules which in-
volve sharing the loss such as comparative negligence, the e¢ cient standards
of proof are weaker and both the plainti¤ and defendant will be found negli-
gent more often. In all cases, e¢ ciency requires that a claim is proved only
if it appears more likely than not by some margin.
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In this analysis, court decisions rest on the relative likelihood of negligent
behavior versus due care. Relative likelihood is meant in the usual mathe-
matical sense. Specically, courts do not use Bayesian inference to update
priors about how parties generally behave. It has been noted by several au-
thors that the courtsdecision process in this respect is typically not Bayesian
and that there are e¢ ciency-based rationales (i.e., the provision of incentives)
for rules of evidence and rules of proof e.g., Posner (1999), Daughety and
Reinganum (2000a, 2000b), Fluet (2003), Demougin and Fluet (2006). In the
above framework, this means that courts disregard any understanding they
may have of equilibrium behavior and base their decisions on the weight of
evidence about the partiesactions.
Appendix
Proof of lemma 2: I rst show that argmaxu p(u)f(x; u) is non decreasing
in x. Let p(u0)f(x0; u0)  p(u)f(x0; u) for all u. Then, for u < u0 and x > x0,
p(u)
p(u0)
 f(x
0; u0)
f(x0; u)
<
f(x; u0)
f(x; u)
;
where the strict inequality follows fromMLRP (i.e., f(x; u0)=f(x; u) is strictly
increasing in x if u0 > u). Hence u maximizes the likelihood at x > x0 only
if u  u0. I now show that the latter inequality is strict, focusing on the case
u0 = u. By lemma 1 '0(x) ? 0 if x 7 x0. Now,
@[p(u)f(x; u)]=@uju=u = p0(u)f(x; u) + p(u)fu(x; u) =  '0(x):
Hence, for x > x0 there is u > u with strictly greater likelihood than
u, implying argmaxu p(u)f(x; u) > u. A similar argument shows that
argmaxu p(u)f(x; u) < u
 for x < x0.
Proof of proposition 1: The rst claim follows directly from the lemmas.
Concerning the second, the necessary condition for a maximum is
@p (1  F )
@u
= p0 (1  F )  pFu = 0: (17)
If the maximum is at u for the given bx, condition (5) holds and su¢ ciency
is proved. Necessity follows if
@2p (1  F )
@u2
= p00(1  F )  2p0Fu   pFuu < 0
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whenever (17) holds, i.e., if p (1  F ) is pseudo-concave in u. Substituting
from (17),
@2p (1  F )
@u2
=

p00p
p0
  2p0

Fu   pFuu:
By assumption 3,
@2pF
@p2
=
1
(p0)2

2p0   p
00p
p0

Fu + pFuu

> 0: (18)
Hence, @2p (1  F ) =@u2 < 0 at a stationary point, which is therefore a global
maximum.
Proof of proposition 3: The proof is similar to that of proposition 1.
I only show the necessity of condition (11). The rst-order condition for a
maximum is
@p[1  F (1 G)]
@u
= pu   (puF + pFu) (1 G) = 0: (19)
It remains to show that u satisfying (19) is a global maximum. This follows
if p[1   F (1   G)] is pseudo-concave in u, i.e., if for any solution satisfying
(19)
@2p[1  F (1 G)]
@u2
= puu   (puuF + 2 puFu + pFuu) (1 G)
= puu  

puuF + 2 puFu + pFuu
puF + pFu

pu < 0; (20)
where the second expression is obtained by substituting from (19). The
inequality (20) is equivalent to
2pu   puup
pu

Fu + pFuu > 0;
which follows from assumption 3 (see (18) in the proof of proposition 1).
Proof of proposition 4: The claims (i) and (ii) and the statement that
poorer evidence about injurers benets victims follow from the discussion. I
prove that victims also benet from poorer evidence about their own precau-
tions. A less informative G implies an increase in the type 1 error . From
(9),
dbx
d
=
puF + pFu
(1  )(puf + pfu) > 0
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where the denominator is negative for bx < x0. The e¤ect on injurersex-
pected liability costs is
dpF (1  )
d
=  pF + p(1  )f dbx
d
= p2

fFu   Ffu
puf + pfu

> 0;
where the numerator is negative by MLRP.
Proof of proposition 5: y0 > by is obvious from (14) given  < 1. x0 > bx
follows from (13) if G(y0; v) is decreasing in . From (14),
dG(y0; v)
d
= G+ g
dy0
d
=

gvG  gGv
pvg + pgv

p < 0: (21)
The numerator is positive by MLRP and the denominator negative since
y0 < y0. Potential victims are better o¤ under comparative negligence if
p[1  F (1  G)] is increasing in . Now,
dF (1  G)
d
= (1  G)f dx
0
d
  F dG
d
: (22)
From (13),
dx0
d
=
puF + pFu
(1  G)(puf + pfu)
dG
d
:
Substituting in (22),
dF (1  G]
d
= p

fFu   fuF
puf + pfu

dG
d
< 0:
The sign follows from (21), MLRP and puf + pfu < 0 for x0 < x0.
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